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JOHN KING GAMBLE, JR.*
DANA D. PISCHERt

The International Court of Justice:
A Test of Suggested Reforms
I. Introduction
During most of the twentieth century, international legal scholars have been
deeply concerned with the prospects and processes for judicial settlement of
international disputes. This preoccupation is neither surprising nor intrinsically
undesirable. Our focus here will be on the most ambitious recent manifestation
of judicial settlement of disputes, the International Court of Justice (ICJ). For
thirty years the ICJ has been available to states for the peaceful settlement of
disputes and to organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations for
advisory opinions, but fundamental doubts about the practical utility of the
Court exist.
There is a marked asymmetry between expectation and performance. At the
San Francisco Conference optimism abounded:
On the basis of the texts proposed for the Charter and for the Statute, the First
Committee ventures to foresee a significant role for the new Court in the international
relations of the future. The judicial process will have a central place in the plans of the
United Nations for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. An
adequate tribunal will exist for the exercise of the judicial function, and it will rank
as a principal organ of the Organization. It is confidently anticipated that the jurisdiction of this tribunal will be extended as time goes on, and past experience warrants
the expectation that its exercise of this jurisdiction will commend a general support.
A long road has been traveled in the effort to enthrone law as the guide for the
conduct of states in their relations one with another. A new milepost is now to be
created along that road. In establishing the International Court of Justice, the United
Nations hold before a war-stricken world the beacons of Justice and Law and offer the
possibility of substituting orderly judicial processes for the vicissitudes of war and the
reign of brutal force.'
There is widespread agreement that the Court has not lived up to these early
expectations, at least quantitatively and probably qualitatively as well. Not
*Head of the Division of Social and Behavior Sciences, Behrend College, Pennsylvania State
University.
tAssistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, George Washington
University, Washington, D.C.
'Report of the Rapporteur of Committee IV-1, UN Con. on Inter. Org., Doc. 913, vol. 13, 393
(1945).
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surprisingly, one finds a significant modification of the early expectations as
the Court's actual performance began to unfold. In 1965 Rosenne described
the Court as playing "a constructive role in the pacific settlement of international disputes despite the constantly disintegrating international situation." 2
During the last decade expectations have been scaled down still further.
Perhaps typical is the view of Arthur Rovine who finds that the Court has few
opportunities to act and that, on balance, the Court may take its place as one
of the more notable failures in the search for methods of peaceful settlement
of international disputes. 3
Concomitant with the realization that the ICJ was not playing an important
enough role have been suggestions for improving prospects for the Court's use.
Our purpose here is to examine these normative suggestions and to illustrate
how some of them can be tested by a careful macroscopic analysis of the Court's
past work. The principal tenet of our approach is that there are clear patterns
of Court use and of state relationships with the Court. These patterns are discernible if one is willing to take a broad view of all the Court's activity rather
than concentrating on a detailed analysis of a few specific cases. In the balance
of this piece we shall review suggestions for improving the utility of the ICJ and
then shall test the possible impact of implementing certain of the suggestions.
I. The Reform Proposals4
Most of the literature addressing the underuse of the Court shares an underlying assumption that improved organization and procedures are the key to
increasing the Court's activity.' Consequently, there tends to be a common
emphasis on reform of the Court. The reformers want to amend or outflank
those parts of the Statute that limit access to the Court. The myriad of proposals
are of two main types: those focusing on tightening the commitment to compulsory jurisdiction and those improving the structure and machinery of the
Court. 6 In addition, there is another group that concentrates on influencing
the attitudes of national decision-makers toward the Court.
The proposals focusing on the level of commitment to adjudication by the
Court emphasize the need for creating binding obligations for states to use the

2

S. ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 19 (1965).

3

A Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, in L. GROSS (ed.),

THE FUTURE OF THE

(1975).
'Portions of this section have been extracted from J.GAMBLE AND D. FISCHER, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976) especially pp. 11-30 and are presented here with the
permission of D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington, MA.
1C. Dalfen, The World Court: Reform or Re-Appraisal, CAN. Y.B INT'L L. 213 (1968). See also
W. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 119-20 (1964).
'Id. (Dalfen) 212-13.
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
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Court. One writer distinguishes two groups in this category, which he labels
"consolidation" proposals and "gradualist" proposals. 7
The "consolidation" proposals seek to plug loopholes in the Optional Clause
(article 36(2)) as it exists. The frequent use of reservations of increasingly arbitrary character in declarations accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court has been a matter of serious concern. 8 The effect of a state's reservation
goes far beyond the claimed right to determine whether its reservation applies
in a given case. What the state claims for itself must be conceded to other states
on the basis of reciprocity.' Other proposals in this category seek to reserve the
right to terminate reservations without notice and/or to limit the number and
types of reservations. '0
The "gradualist" proposals go beyond the reservation problem and focus on
spreading and strengthening commitment "by directing states towards assuming obligations in certain areas which should become nuclei of agreement
around which layers of commitment gradually grow until all possible international disputes are encompassed."' 1 Lauterpacht has suggested reversion to
the alternate form of the Optional Clause which was proposed and rejected in
San Francisco in 1946, i.e., compulsory jurisdiction unless states contract out. 12
Another suggestion is that more compromissory clauses be included in multilateral treaties negotiated under the framework of the United Nations. 3
The reform proposals dealing with altering the structure and machinery of
the Court have many different emphases. Some want to amend the Statute to
broaden the class of parties that may come before the Court to include international organizations and/or individuals."' Much attention has been paid to
streamlining the Court's procedures, e.g., accelerating the process of litigation. ISOther proposals would expand the types of proceedings available before
the Court,16 e.g., measures that would take the "adversary" out of proceed-

'Id. 215-17.
'C. Waldock, The Decline of the Optional Clause, 32 BIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 244-87 (1955-56).
'L. Gross, Bulgaria Invokes the Connally Amendment, 56 AJIL 357-82 (1962).
"H. Briggs, Reservations to the Acceptance of the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the ICJ, 93
RECUEIL DES COURS 293 (1958); L. Sohn, Step-by-Step Acceptance of theJurisdictionoftheICJ, 58
AJIL PRoc. 131 (1964).
"Dalfen, supra note 5 at 216.
2
Cited by GRoss, supra note 3 at 314.
"E. Warren, Toward a More Active InternationalCourt, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 296 (1971).
"L. Gross, InternationalCourt ofJustice: Considerationof Requirementsfor Enhancing Its Role
in the InternationalLegalOrder, 65 AJIL 302 (1971); JENKS, supra note 5 at 209; P. Jessup, The
InternationalCourt of Justice Revisited, 2 VA. J. INT'L L. 306 (1971); J. Fawcett, The Function of
the InternationalCourt of Justice in the World Community. 2 GA. J. OF INT'L AND COM. L. 62-3
(1971); T. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY 212-38 (1968).
"L. Gross, The Time Element in Contentious Proceedings in the ICJ, 63 AJIL 74-86 (1967);
Fawcett, supra note 14 at 60-1; Jessup, supra note 14 at 304-5; J. Verzijl, The PresentStagnation of
InterstateAdjudication: Causes and Possible Remedies, 2 INT'L RELATIONS 491 (1963).
"6JENKS, supra note 5 at 119-84, develops a number of possible procedures.
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ings. I7 Another major group of reforms deals with the size and composition of
the Court. The lack of confidence in the Court's impartiality and objectivity
has been widely identified as a crucial factor in its underuse. It is argued that
the Court is loaded in favor of the "West" and the forces of "conservatism."' 8
Gross has assessed the need for change in a number of aspects of the Court's
composition. 9 Finally, there are proposals which deal with clarifying the
sources of law applied by the Court as provided by article 38 of the Statute.2"
It is argued that states would have greater confidence in the law the Court
applies if that law more explicitly reflected the interests of the entire community
of nations. 2 The third group of reform proposals directs attention to the attitudes of statesmen which ultimately determine use or nonuse of the Court.22
With few exceptions these reform proposals are derived principally from an
examination of the legal bases of the ICJ. It is revealing that most of the reform
proposals could have been made thirty years ago when the Statute was being
drafted! It seems to us that the reform proposals have paid insufficiept attention
to the actual practice of the Court. Since we have a wide range of states that
have some relationship with the Court, it need not be difficult to anticipate the
probable results of implementing some of the suggested reforms.
III. Testing the Reform Proposals
There are two distinct ways in which proposals for reforming the International Court of Justice can be developed and tested. The first is logical. The
second is empirical, i.e., looking at exactly what the Court has done in its thirtyyear history. For example, one could draw a perfectly reasonable logical inference that if states withdrew their reservations to the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court, the Court would be more widely used. On the empirical level one can
test the same proposition by inquiring if those states having few reservations to
the Optional Clause have, in fact, tended to make more use of the Court.
We acknowledge that some suggested reforms are not easy to test. Most
conspicuous are those concerning state attitudes towards the Court.23 However,

"Gross, supra note 14 at 279.
"WVerzijl, supra note 15 at 488-89; M. Bartos, The Statute of the ICI: Reform Pending, 25 REv.
OF INTER. AFF. 9 (1974).
"Gross, supra note 14 at 281-99.
"Id. 317; R. Higgins, The UN and Lawmaking: The Political Organs. 64 AJIL PROC. 37-48
(1970).
"Gross, supra note 14 at 319-20.
I'Verzijl, supra note 15 at 479; Fitzmaurice, Enlargement of the Contentious Jurisdictionof the
Court, in GRoss, supra note 3.
"There are no reliable surveys of state attitudes toward the Court although several attempts at
assessing these attitudes have been made. Most recently is a questionnaire circulated by the UN
Secretary-General-see REVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, UNGA,
26th Session, A/8382, 15 Sept. 1971.
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three of the suggested reforms will be examined and compared with the factual
record amassed during the Court's history. The first reform that will be tested
is the proposition that increasing the level of acceptance of the Optional Clause
would result in more use of the Court. Second is the suggestion that if states
increased the number of clauses in their treaties calling for submission of disputes to the ICJ, the result would be more Court activity. Third is the idea that
if the Court were more broadly based, e.g., if more states had judges on the
Court, states would have more confidence in the Court and would be more
likely to make use of the Court.
In the discussion that follows we have assumed that actual appearances
before the ICJ in contentious cases are the best indicator of states' support for
the Court. We have argued elsewhere that support for the Court consists of at
least three components, i.e., appearances, degree of acceptance of the Optional
Clause, and attitudes. 24 For our purposes here, it seems preferable to concentrate on the least refutable component of support. The history of the Court
readily reveals the nature and extent of the relationship between acceptance
of the Optional Clause and use of the ICJ for settlement of disputes. The
number of times each state has appeared before the Court in contentious cases
is a matter of record. Most states have never appeared before the Court; to be
exact 116 states have never appeared. Twenty-six states have appeared in
exactly one contentious proceeding each. Only eight states have appeared before
the Court more than once. The degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause
is also a matter of record and is easily determined for each state. In this case,
there are five basic possibilities:
1. no acceptance of the ICJ Statute
2. acceptance of the ICJ Statute, but not of the Optional Clause
3. acceptance of the Optional Clause with severe reservations
4. acceptance of the Optional Clause with minor reservations
5. acceptance of the Optional Clause without reservation.
Table 125 provides a compact way of viewing the relationship between actual
appearances before the ICJ and degree of acceptance of the Optional Clause. (See
Table I on page 173.) Each state is classified according to both characteristics.
For example, the United States is placed in a category with India and the
United Kingdom by virtue of the fact that all three have accepted the Optional
Clause, albeit with severe reservations, and all three have appeared before the

'

2

See

GAMBLE and FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

81-9 (1976).

Ail tables use six letter abbreviations for state names. In almost all instances the abbreviations
are the first six letters of the states' names or some other easily recognized formulation, e.g.,
GERM.W is the Federal Republic of Germany. In cases of doubt see GAMBLE and FISCHER, supra
note 24 at 131-35.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 1

168

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

Court more than once. The most conspicuous thing about the table is the large
number of states that have never appeared before the Court in contentious
proceedings; but this should not be surprising to any student of the Court.
The principal reason for constructing the table was to inquire if the degree
of acceptance of the Optional Clause has any demonstrable effect on states'
actual appearances before the Court. The top row in the table reveals nothing
unexpected, i.e., those states that have not accepted the Statute have never
appeared before the Court. However, the next four rows indicate considerable
variation in appearance propensity. The results can be summarized concisely
in this way:
Degree of

Number (%)

Number (%) Appearing

Acceptance of
Optional Clause

Never Appearing
Before the Court

Before the Court
at Least Once

Acceptance of the
Statute but not
the Optional Clause
Acceptance of the
Optional Clause with
severe reservations
Acceptance of the
Optional Clause with
minor reservations
Acceptance of the
Optional Clause
without reservation

80 (85%)

14 (15%)

12

(63%)

7 (37%)

6

(35%)

11 (65%)

6 (75%)

2 (25%)

The results here are most revealing. There is no doubt that those states
accepting the Optional Clause to any degree are more likely to make use of the
Court. But the results are mixed. One might draw the logical inference that as
the degree of reservation to the Optional Clause declines, use of the Court would
increase. This seems to be the case only at certain levels; when one looks at the
"no reservation" category the inferred pattern does not exist. This suggests that
most change in favor of the increased use of the Court occurs when one moves
from those states with severe reservations to those with only minor reservations.
This would imply that most effort at reforming the Court should be directed
at convincing states to accept the Optional Clause or to soften their reservations
to the clause. For example, in the United States' case the Connally amendment
might be replaced with a less debilitating reservation. But this line of reasoning
has its limits; the United States is already a frequent user of the Court, at least
in comparison to most other states. Thus it seems that encouraging states
towards wider acceptance of the optional clause would probably have some
tendency to increase use of the Court, but results would likely be unspectacular,
even capricious.
Next we shall examine states' treaty clauses providing for use of the ICJ in
the event of disputes arising under the terms of the treaties. Recently data have
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. I
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become available on the totality of post-World War II treaty making.26 Thus
it is possible to note exactly how many treaties with ICJ disputes settlement
clause commitments have been concluded by each state. This matter could be
approached in two ways. We could calculate what percentage of each state's
treaties have ICJ disputes settlement clauses or, alternatively, concern ourselves
only with the absolute numbers of ICJ dispute settlement clauses in treaties
concluded. Both methods were explored; it was found that only the latter
produced significant results.
Table 1I follows a similar procedure to that employed in Table I, except that
appearances before the Court are compared with the number of ICJ dispute
settlement treaties to which each state is party. (See Table II on page 175.) The
results are quite conclusive and can be summarized as follows:
Number of ICI
Dispute Settlement
Clause Treaties

Number (%)
Never Appearing
Before the Court

Number (%) Appearing
Before the Court
at Least Once

More than 15 treaties
11 - 15 treaties

6 (30%)
13 (65%)

14 (70%)
7 (35%)

6 - 10 treaties
Fewer than 6 treaties

32 (84%)
42 (86%)

6 (16%)
7 (14%)

Evidently, concluding treaties with ICJ dispute settlement clauses does result
in states making more use of the Court. We see a vast difference in the rate
of Court appearances. Seventy percent of those states with more than 15 treaties
have appeared before the Court. In contrast, only 14 percent of those states
with less than six treaties have appeared before the Court. This provides irrefutable evidence that there is a relationship between the two attributes. But
things are not as simple as this first blush examination might suggest.
Few contentious cases have reached the Court because of a treaty clause
stipulating use of the Court for dispute settlement. Thus in most cases these
clauses have not been a direct cause of the appearances before the Court. How
then does one account for the strong relationship? One possible explanation
is that concluding treaties with ICJ dispute settlement clauses is reflective of
a supportive attitude toward the Court and that it is this attitude that ultimately
results in states making use of the Court. Furthermore, since ICJ dispute
settlement clauses never specify use of the ICJ if other methods are available,

2
We are indebted to the Treaty Research Center at the University of Washington and to its
director, Professor Peter H. Rohn, for providing us with much of the needed treaty data. In
addition, C. George Reithel's "Dispute Settlement Clauses in Treaties: A Quantitative Analysis"
was most helpful.
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one might infer that such clauses have a more symbolic, attitudinal importance
than resulting directly in use of the Court.
Another aspect of Table II and, to a lesser extent, of Table I concerns the
role of developed, Western states. It is well known that Western states, especially
Western European, have been the most frequent users of the Court. Perhaps
less well known is the fact that these Western states are prolific treaty-makers
concluding agreements at many times the rate of most other states. Thus it is
possible that the results in Table II are due at least in part to the concurrence
of these two attributes, i.e., treaty-making and Court use, within this one group
of states. However, it is our feeling that this is not sufficient to explain such
strong patterns.
Table III examines another type of assumption about the Court, i.e.,
broader-based participation among ICJ judges would encourage states to make
more use of the Court. (See Table III on page 177.) Of course, this was assumed at
the time the Statute was drafted and resulted in provisions for judges ad hoc.
Table III attempts to test a rather simple proposition: do those states that have
frequently had nationals as judges on the Court tend to appear more frequently
before the Court than do states that have been less well represented on the
bench?
Number of Years
with National
as Judge on ICI
More than 10 years
with a national
judge
I - 10 years with
a judge
No judge on Court

No Appearances
Before the Court

At Least One
Appearance
Before the Court

9 (64%)

5 (36%)

9 (56%)

7 (44%)

98 (82%)

22

(18%)

The picture is a mixed one. While having a judge on the Court appears in
overall terms to dispose states towards slightly more use of the Court, there are
certain incongruities. The middle group with judges on the Court for 1-10 years
has an appearance rate of 44% whereas the group with ICJ judges for more
than ten years has a rate of only 30%. Part of this is certainly attributable to
the USSR and East European states, several of which have been heavily represented on the Court but, except for Albania and Bulgaria, none has appeared
before the Court.
Since many of the proposals for reforming the Court emphasize the necessity
of making the Court more compatible with the aspirations of the developing
states, it is important to look for any effect that representation among the
Court's judges has had on these developing states. Of those developing states
that have had some representation among ICJ judges, 19% have appeared
before the Court at least once. Among those developing states that have. never
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 11, No. 1
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had nationals as judges on the Court, 11% have had at least one appearance
before the Court. This suggests a slightly increased tendency to use the Court
because states have nationals as judges on the Court. At the very least these
results indicate that changing the Statute so that many more nationals are
represented would not have the profound effect envisioned by some. In fact, it
is quite possible that the marginal increase in Court activity would be offset
by the negative effects of a larger and more cumbersome adjudicative body.
IV. Conclusions
It is evident that suggestions for "reforming" the International Court of
Justice have not achieved their desired goal. If there is any trend, it is in the
direction of less ICJ activity. 7 This is sufficient in our opinion to suggest that
some of the reform proposals have been misdirected. While in each of the three
"reforms" that was tested empirically some positive influence was projected,
we imagine that the effect is significantly smaller than has been presumed by
the reformers themselves.
It is our contention that suggestions for changes and reform of the Court
must, if they are to have any chance of success, address themselves more directly
to the political realities of the Court's history. The Court is a political phenomenon subject to numerous political pressures, not the least of which is the
decision made by national governments to use or not to use the institution of
the Court. The tables confirm that certain states have a disposition to use the
Court regardless of their stand on the Optional Clause. For example, the United
Kingdom, the most frequent user of the Court, has rather severe reservations
attached to its acceptance of the Optional Clause. Additionally, of the eight
states that have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court without reservation, only
two have ever appeared before the Court. Since this group is comprised entirely
of developing countries, one questions the impact of many more third world
countries accepting the Optional Clause.
The tables demonstrate graphically that the Court is still dominated by
Western states. Although developing states now have an overwhelming numerical edge and are asserting themselves in many forums, fully one-half of Court
appearances have been made by Western European states and their political/
ideological heirs, e.g., the United States and Australia. This lopsidedness in
use of the Court should give reformers cause for alarm. Are the reform proposals an attempt to apply Western standards and perceptions to an institution
that is intended to be global in nature? We feel that the ineffectiveness of the
proposals and continued Western dominance of the Court suggest that this may
be the case.

7

' GAMBLE and FISCHER, supra note 24 at 106.
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It is clear that any attempt to reform the Court will encounter monumental
political restraints, restraints that may be so basic as to preclude any meaningful reform. This may be the case with the Optional Clause; few states seem to
be willing to relinquish sovereignty by accepting the Optional Clause with fewer
reservations. There is a disturbing tendency to ignore the problems and lessons
that should have been learned from the ICJ. For example, the United Nations
Law of the Sea Conference seems destined to establish a new dispute settlement
tribunal at least in part because of the inadequacies of the ICJ. 2 8 However, there
remains serious doubt whether any new tribunal can avoid all or even some of
the problems that have pushed the ICJ to the brink of atrophy.
Unquestionably the pacific settlement of international disputes remains one
of the principal goals of international law. But the International Court of Justice
has been shown to be infrequently and incompletely effective in achieving this
goal. This situation has created pressures for reform in the nature and functioning of the Court. But it is vital that suggested reforms be cast in terms of what
is politically possible and that the possible results of implementing reforms be
examined in light of the complete past record of the Court.

"For excellent discussions of the dispute settlement problems at the Third United Nations Law of
the Sea Conference see L. Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Arising out of the Law of the Sea
Convention. 12 SAN DiEGo L. R. 495-517 (1975); A. Adede, Settlement of DisputesArising Under
the Law of the Sea Convention, 69 AJIL 798-818 (1975).
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